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the same time, revisiting McCleskey and its progeny raises questions about
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remedies for bias in the criminal justice system that do not depend solely on
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INTRODUCTION
Fifty years ago in Alice’s Restaurant,1 Arlo Guthrie sang of “a typical
case of American blind justice.”2 Thirty years ago in McCleskey v. Kemp,3
the Supreme Court refused to accept statistical evidence of discrimination in
an equal protection challenge to the death penalty. The Justices have crafted
equal protection case law so that it is hard for minority plaintiffs to challenge
facially neutral state action—first requiring plaintiffs to prove discriminatory
purpose and then making discriminatory purpose exceedingly difficult to
prove.4 After decades of discouraging claimants like Warren McCleskey, the
Court now has an equal protection docket dominated by majority plaintiffs
challenging race-conscious civil rights remedies.5
At a time when incarceration rates were skyrocketing, the Supreme
Court restricted the use of statistical evidence to prove discriminatory
purpose in death penalty cases.6 Three decades later, with race still a virulent

1

ARLO GUTHRIE, Alice’s Restaurant Massacree, on ALICE’S RESTAURANT (Warner Bros. 1967).
Id. (“Obie came to the realization that it was a typical case of American blind justice, and there
wasn’t nothing he could do about it . . . .”).
3
481 U.S. 279 (1987).
4
See Reva B. Siegel, The Supreme Court, 2012 Term—Foreword: Equality Divided, 127 HARV. L.
REV. 1, 9–23 (2013) [hereinafter Siegel, Equality Divided]; see also Reva Siegel, Why Equal Protection
No Longer Protects: The Evolving Forms of Status-Enforcing State Action, 49 STAN. L. REV. 1111, 1113
(1997) [hereinafter Siegel, Why Equal Protection No Longer Protects].
5
See, e.g., Siegel, Equality Divided, supra note 4, at 1–58.
6
For McCleskey’s social context, see infra notes 102–104 and accompanying text. For commentary
on McCleskey’s impact in the legal system, see infra notes 107–111 and accompanying text.
2
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force in American politics,7 there is renewed interest in discriminatory
purpose doctrine.8 McCleskey’s history helps us think about the doctrine’s
structure and how it could yet evolve, even as that history cautions against
relying solely on courts for redress of bias in the criminal justice system.9
Thirty years ago in McCleskey v. Kemp,10 the Court was presented with
the “Baldus study,”11 social science evidence showing that race—the race of
the defendant and the race of the victim—played a significant role in
determining who was selected for the death penalty in Georgia. McCleskey’s
lawyers offered this evidence as part of a discriminatory purpose claim of
race discrimination.12 The Court assumed the validity of the social science
evidence showing that race mattered in determining whether a convicted
felon received the death penalty but refused to consider it as evidence of
discriminatory purpose in McCleskey’s case, suggesting that statistical
evidence could not be used to prove discriminatory purpose in a death
penalty case in the ways it was used in employment discrimination and other
constitutional cases.13
Why did the Court narrow discriminatory purpose claims as it did in
McCleskey? Beginning in the 1970s, the Burger Court had begun to shift the
7
The Supreme Court has recently suggested that race discrimination is waning. See Shelby County
v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612, 2618 (2013) (“There is no denying . . . that the conditions that originally
justified these measures no longer characterize voting in the covered jurisdictions.”). But there is
abundant evidence to the contrary. See, e.g., First Amended Complaint at 2, Sines v. Kessler, No. 3:17cv-00072-NKM (W.D. Va. Jan. 5, 2018) (“Over the weekend of August 11 and 12, 2017, hundreds of
neo-Nazis and white supremacists traveled from near and far to descend upon the college town of
Charlottesville, Virginia . . . .”).
8
Sam Bagenstos has criticized scholars’ preoccupation with implicit bias in part because it “suggests
that the most prevalent form of discrimination is unconscious, when conscious bias, stereotyping, and
prejudice may be just as important in practice.” See Samuel R. Bagenstos, Implicit Bias’s Failure,
39 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. (forthcoming 2018). Other scholars have called for renewed engagement
with discriminatory purpose doctrine. See, e.g., Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Constitutionally Forbidden
Legislative
Intent,
130 HARV.
L.
REV.
523,
527
(2016)
(arguing
that
“intent-, purpose-, and motivation-based doctrines cry out for reexamination and reform”); Aziz Z. Huq,
Judging Discriminatory Intent, 103 CORNELL L. REV. (forthcoming 2018) (manuscript at 6) (on file with
the Northwestern University Law Review) (showing that four cases “all from a single four-month period
in 2017—show the problem of discriminatory intent to be pervasive” but that “forty or so years’ applying
a ‘discriminatory intent’ touchstone have not elicited either a stable formulation of the term or a
predictable evidentiary framework for identifying such intent”); Michael Selmi, Statistical Inequality and
Intentional (Not Implicit) Discrimination, 79 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 199, 202 (2016) (arguing that
“observed disparities should not be confused with implicit bias as repeated patterns of behavior will
almost certainly have a conscious component to them”).
9
See infra notes 116–122 and accompanying text.
10
481 U.S. 279 (1987).
11
Id. at 286.
12
Brief for Petitioner at 80–89, McCleskey, 481 U.S. 279 (No. 84-6811). The plaintiffs also raised
an Eighth Amendment challenge. Id. at 41.
13
See infra notes 41–46 and accompanying text.
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work of civil rights reform from the courts to the political branches.14 The
Rehnquist Court continued this trend in McCleskey. The Court explained that
restricting the use of statistical evidence to prove discriminatory purpose in
a death penalty case was needed to protect the exercise of prosecutorial
discretion, yet said more, questioning whether discrimination explained
disparities in the criminal justice system and asserting the importance of
judges deferring to community controls on the criminal law.15
Reading McCleskey in its historical context has both critical and
constructive purposes. The historical reading allows us to explore the very
different kinds of considerations that animated the Court’s decision to reject
statistical evidence of discriminatory purpose in the case, and to debate anew
the prospective reach of the Court’s judgment. A close, critical reading of
the case has led some courts to interpret McCleskey’s restrictions on
statistical evidence as concerned only with protecting prosecutorial
discretion, and to identify openings for statistical evidence of bias in the
criminal justice system today.16 At the same time, examining McCleskey’s
legacy raises deep questions about the capacity of courts to redress bias in
the criminal justice system. It reminds us that it is important to design
remedies for bias in the criminal justice system that do not depend solely on
judges for implementation.17
To begin the day’s conversation, Part I offers a quick sketch of the
Baldus findings and of McCleskey’s equal protection claim. Part II shows
how the Rehnquist Court narrowed discriminatory purpose doctrine as it
rejected McCleskey’s claim, on terms designed to restrict statistical evidence
in proving discriminatory purpose claims involving the death penalty and
possibly other aspects of the criminal justice system. Part III locates the
Court’s hostility to statistical proof of discrimination in conservative
mobilizations of the 1980s and explores the understanding of social
stratification on which hostility to statistical proof of discrimination was
premised. I conclude with a key implication of this reading of McCleskey for
the critical social sciences: Employ pluricentric rather than juricentric
interventions to combat racial bias in the criminal justice system.
I.

MCCLESKEY’S EQUAL PROTECTION ARGUMENT

Warren McCleskey was black. He killed a white police officer during a
robbery. “The jury found two aggravating circumstances—the victim was a

14
15
16
17
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See infra Part III.
See infra notes 113–115 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 116–122 and accompanying text.
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police officer and the homicide occurred in the course of an armed robbery—
and returned a death sentence.”18 In challenging his death sentence under the
Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments, McCleskey’s lawyers introduced
evidence that race was another unnamed “aggravating factor” in his
sentencing decision. In earlier cases, lawyers had tried and failed to establish
racial bias in sentencing through social science evidence.19
But McCleskey’s lawyers thought they had a study that was sufficiently
particularized to show bias in the administration of the Georgia death penalty
statute and, by extension, in McCleskey’s case. The Baldus study showed
that race mattered in death sentencing in Georgia in two ways: death
sentences were more likely in cases involving white victims and in cases
involving black defendants. The Baldus study analyzed the murder cases of
more than 2,000 defendants in Georgia during the 1970s.20 Looking at the
race of the victim alone, “defendants charged with killing white persons
received the death penalty in 11% of the cases, but defendants charged with
killing blacks received the death penalty in only 1% of the cases.”21 David
Baldus examined “230 variables that could have explained the disparities on
nonracial grounds.”22 In one model, “even after taking account of 39
nonracial variables, defendants charged with killing white victims were 4.3
times as likely to receive a death sentence as defendants charged with killing
blacks.”23
The Baldus study illuminated the hidden role of race in McCleskey’s
sentencing. Baldus’s 230-variable model ranked death-eligible cases
according to the offense’s level of aggravation.24 Baldus found that “the
effects of racial bias were most striking in the midrange cases” of
aggravation where the decisionmakers experienced the most discretion about
whether to give the death penalty.25 Focusing on these cases, Baldus showed
that “14.4% of the black-victim midrange cases received the death penalty,
and 34.4% of the white-victim [midrange] cases received the death
18
David C. Baldus et al., Reflections on the “Inevitability” of Racial Discrimination in Capital
Sentencing and the “Impossibility” of Its Prevention, Detection, and Correction, 51 WASH. & LEE L.
REV. 359, 364 (1994) (citing McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 284–85 (1987)).
19
In 1968, the Eighth Circuit, in an opinion by then-Judge Harry Blackmun, rejected such social
science evidence on the grounds that it was not sufficiently detailed and that it failed to show intentional
discrimination in the defendant’s case. Maxwell v. Bishop, 398 F.2d 138, 146–47 (8th Cir. 1968),
vacated, 398 U.S. 262 (1970); see Samuel R. Gross, David Baldus and the Legacy of McCleskey v. Kemp,
97 IOWA L. REV. 1905, 1906 (2012).
20
McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 286.
21
Id.
22
Id. at 287.
23
Id.
24
Id. at 287 n.5.
25
Id.
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penalty.”26 On Baldus’s analysis of the facts, McCleskey’s case fell “within
the midrange.”27 And the study further showed that the race of the defendant
mattered, though not as dramatically as the race of the victim.28 Thus, the
Baldus study indicated that “black defendants, such as McCleskey, who kill
white victims have the greatest likelihood of receiving the death penalty.”29
McCleskey’s lawyers—Jack Boger, Tony Amsterdam, and Deval
Patrick among others30—set out to translate these empirical findings about
capital sentencing in Georgia into an equal protection challenge to
McCleskey’s death sentence.31 Invoking then-prevailing equal protection
frameworks, they argued that the defendant in a capital sentencing case had
the burden of proving purposeful discrimination, which the defendant in a
capital sentencing proceeding could meet, quoting Washington v. Davis,32
“by showing that the totality of relevant facts gives rise to an inference of
discriminatory purpose.”33 Once McCleskey met that burden, “the burden
shifts to the State to explain adequately the racial exclusion.”34
But—and here we face the $64,000 question—did the evidence of the
Baldus study “give rise to an inference of discriminatory purpose” within the
meaning of the Court’s equal protection cases circa 1986–1987?
McCleskey’s lawyers saw clear support in Castaneda v. Partida,35 a 1977
equal protection case decided the year after Davis, in which the Court had
allowed Mexican-Americans to establish a prima facie case of intentional
discrimination through statistics showing an underrepresentation of their
group in grand jury selection.36 And McCleskey’s lawyers pointed to Village
of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp.,37 also
decided the year after Davis, arguing that Arlington Heights allowed
plaintiffs to show purpose, and here I quote their brief, by demonstrating “(i)
the racial impact of the challenged action, (ii) the existence of a system
affording substantial state discretion, and (iii) a history of prior
26

Id.
Id.
28
The McCleskey majority opinion reports that “black defendants were 1.1 times as likely to receive
a death sentence as other defendants.” Id. at 287.
29
Id.
30
See JEFFREY L. KIRCHMEIER, IMPRISONED BY THE PAST: WARREN MCCLESKEY AND THE
AMERICAN DEATH PENALTY 306 (2015).
31
For Jack Boger’s account of the case, see John Charles Boger, McCleskey v. Kemp: Field Notes
from 1977–1991, 112 NW. U. L. REV. 1637 (2018).
32
426 U.S. 229 (1976).
33
Brief for Petitioner, supra note 12, at 47 (quoting Davis, 426 U.S. at 239–42).
34
Id. at 47–48 (citing Alexander v. Louisiana, 405 U.S. 625, 632 (1972)).
35
430 U.S. 482 (1977).
36
Id. at 494–95 (noting that the burden then shifts to the state to rebut the case).
37
429 U.S. 252 (1977).
27
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discrimination.”38 McCleskey’s lawyers also reminded the Court of its recent
Title VII decision in Bazemore v. Friday39 addressing the use of multiple
regression analyses in a Title VII pattern-and-practice case of wage
discrimination against North Carolina public employees. “Reduced to its
essence,” McCleskey’s lawyers argued:
[P]etitioner’s submission to the Court is a simple one. Evidence of racial
discrimination that would amply suffice if the stakes were a job promotion
[Bazemore], or the selection of a jury [Castaneda], should not be disregarded
when the stakes are life and death. Methods of proof and fact-finding accepted
as necessary in every other area of law should not be jettisoned in this one.40

Of course, distinguish is exactly what the Supreme Court’s decision in
McCleskey’s case did. Almost eerily as if in reply to McCleskey’s lawyers,
Justice Powell emphasized that statistical evidence that might suffice in those
cases would not suffice to prove discriminatory purpose in McCleskey’s
case. Justice Powell objected to McCleskey relying solely on statistical
evidence to prove discriminatory purpose in his case.41 Yet he went further,
and expressed wide-ranging skepticism about the use of statistical evidence
to prove discriminatory purpose in any equal protection challenge in a
criminal case. Even as the majority accepted the statistical “validity” of the
Baldus study, it rejected statistics as an evidentiary basis for McCleskey’s
equal protection claim:
Our assumption that the Baldus study is statistically valid does not include the
assumption that the study shows that racial considerations actually enter into
any sentencing decisions in Georgia. Even a sophisticated multiple-regression
analysis such as the Baldus study can only demonstrate a risk that the factor of
race entered into some capital sentencing decisions and a necessarily lesser risk
that race entered into any particular sentencing decision.42

While the Court had accepted statistical studies employing multiple
regression analyses as evidence of discrimination in employment
discrimination and equal protection cases such as Bazemore and Castaneda,
the Court held that McCleskey’s case was different: “But the nature of the
capital sentencing decision, and the relationship of the statistics to that
decision, are fundamentally different from the corresponding elements in the
38

Brief for Petitioner, supra note 12, at 50.
478 U.S. 385 (1986).
40
Brief for Petitioner, supra note 12, at 31–32.
41
McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 292–93 (1987) (“Thus, to prevail under the Equal Protection
Clause, McCleskey must prove that the decisionmakers in his case acted with discriminatory purpose. He
offers no evidence specific to his own case that would support an inference that racial considerations
played a part in his sentence. Instead, he relies solely on the Baldus study.”).
42
Id. at 291 n.7.
39
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venire-selection or Title VII cases.”43 To erect a firewall between the
criminal justice setting and those cases where the Court had accepted
statistical evidence as raising inferences about discriminatory bias, the Court
pointed to differences in institutional contexts. The Court emphasized that
decisions in trial and sentencing contexts involve more variables than
decisions in jury selection or Title VII cases—and involve discretion that is
more important to protect.44 The Court also explained that, in other contexts,
“the decisionmaker has an opportunity to explain the statistical disparity,”
but in McCleskey’s case “the State has no practical opportunity to rebut the
Baldus study” and “policy considerations” cautioned against “requiring
prosecutors to defend their decisions to seek death penalties, often years after
they were made.”45
While the Court emphasized differences in institutional contexts, it
never once addressed what these institutions shared in common—the need
to make decisions about persons of different races. After rejecting the Baldus
study as insufficient proof of discriminatory purpose in McCleskey’s case,
the Court seemed wholly uninterested in inviting other plaintiffs to explore
what the “statistically valid”46 Baldus study or other statistical evidence
might show about the risk of racial bias in capital sentencing or the criminal
justice system more generally.47
The Supreme Court went on to reject McCleskey’s argument that the
state had given juries and prosecutors broad discretion in sentencing that was
susceptible to racially discriminatory abuse. “McCleskey . . . appears to
argue that the State has violated the Equal Protection Clause by adopting the
capital punishment statute and allowing it to remain in force despite its
allegedly discriminatory application.”48 Citing Personnel Administrator of
Massachusetts v. Feeney49 (and Wayte v. United States50), Justice Powell
argued,
But ‘“[d]iscriminatory purpose’ . . . implies more than intent as volition or
intent as awareness of consequences. It implies that the decisionmaker, in this
case a state legislature, selected or reaffirmed a particular course of action at

43

Id. at 294.
Id. at 294–95.
45
Id. at 296 (internal quotation marks omitted).
46
Id. at 291 n.7 (“As did the Court of Appeals, we assume the study is valid statistically without
reviewing the factual findings of the District Court.”).
47
For examples, see infra notes 119–122 and accompanying text.
48
McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 297–98.
49
442 U.S. 256 (1979).
50
470 U.S. 598 (1985). Wayte is a case alleging selective prosecution for failure to register for the
military draft that incorporates Feeney standards. See infra note 71 and accompanying text.
44
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least in part ‘because of,’ not merely ‘in spite of,’ its adverse effects upon an
identifiable group.”51

In short, “McCleskey would have to prove that the Georgia Legislature
enacted or maintained the death penalty statute because of an anticipated
racially discriminatory effect.”52 Justice Powell dismissed this possibility in
a sentence, there being, on this definition of discriminatory purpose, “no
evidence . . . that the Georgia Legislature enacted the capital punishment
statute to further a racially discriminatory purpose.”53
II. MCCLESKEY AND DISCRIMINATORY PURPOSE AS A DOCTRINE OF
JUDICIAL DEFERENCE
Why were McCleskey’s lawyers unable to mobilize social science
evidence of racial bias in the administration of Georgia’s death penalty into
a successful equal protection challenge? The standard story points to the
Court’s decision in Washington v. Davis barring disparate impact claims in
constitutional cases as shielding the operations of the criminal justice system
from equal protection challenge. McCleskey’s history reminds us just how
much of this work is performed by subsequent cases that restrict how
discriminatory purpose can be proved.
The standard story goes something like this: During the 1970s,
President Richard Nixon appointed Justices to the Supreme Court54 who took
important steps toward ending the Second Reconstruction when they rejected
disparate impact claims and required plaintiffs alleging equal protection
violations to prove discriminatory purpose in Washington v. Davis. As a
student of Owen Fiss who graduated at the time of McCleskey, I was raised
protesting Davis: I read Owen Fiss’s Groups and the Equal Protection
Clause,55 Alan Freeman’s Legitimizing Racial Discrimination Through
Antidiscrimination Law,56 and Chuck Lawrence’s The Id, the Ego, and Equal

51

McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 298 (alteration in original) (quoting Feeney, 442 U.S. at 279) (citing
Wayte, 470 U.S. at 608–09).
52
Id.
53
Id.
54
President Nixon appointed Justices Warren Burger, Harry Blackmun, Lewis Powell, and William
Rehnquist. See, e.g., MICHAEL J. GRAETZ & LINDA GREENHOUSE, THE BURGER COURT AND THE RISE OF
THE JUDICIAL RIGHT 4–5 (2016) (describing how “Nixon got his four Supreme Court appointments.
Warren Burger was the first [in May 1969] . . . followed by those of Harry Blackmun in May 1970 and
Lewis F. Powell, Jr., and William H. Rehnquist in December 1971”); KEVIN J. MCMAHON, NIXON’S
COURT 6 (2011) (noting that Rehnquist was Nixon’s “conservative” jurist for the Court, while Burger,
Blackmun, and Powell were “his more moderate selections”).
55
Owen M. Fiss, Groups and the Equal Protection Clause, 5 PHIL. & PUB. A FF. 107 (1976).
56
Alan David Freeman, Legitimizing Racial Discrimination Through Antidiscrimination Law: A
Critical Review of Supreme Court Doctrine, 62 MINN. L. REV. 1049 (1978).
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Protection: Reckoning with Unconscious Racism (published at the time of
McCleskey), 57 and tried my own hand at a Davis critique a decade later, first
in Rule of Love58 and then in Why Equal Protection No Longer Protects.59
The standard story is correct, to this extent: The Burger Court reversed
decisions recognizing equal protection claims of unjustified racial disparate
impact in 1976 in Davis and a year later in Arlington Heights. But these
Burger Court cases did not in fact end the role of impact evidence in equal
protection cases. The Burger and Rehnquist Courts did this work in a series
of later decided cases that restrict the role of impact evidence in proving
discriminatory purpose60—cases that include McCleskey.
Before the Supreme Court decided Davis in 1976—and for some years
after—plaintiffs pointed to evidence of racial impact as evidence from which
one could infer discriminatory purpose.61 As Justice John Paul Stevens
explained in his concurring opinion in Davis: “Frequently the most probative
evidence of intent will be objective evidence of what actually happened
rather than evidence describing the subjective state of mind of the actor. For
normally the actor is presumed to have intended the natural consequences of
his deeds.”62
In Davis’s wake, the Court decided cases like Castaneda v. Partida,
allowing plaintiffs to make out a prima facie case of intentional
discrimination by statistical evidence,63 and Arlington Heights, allowing the
introduction of disparate impact evidence and other circumstantial evidence
from which inferences about discrimination might be drawn.64 Both these
cases, decided the year after Davis, are cases on which McCleskey’s lawyers
drew to build their statistical evidence into a prima facie case of
discrimination.65

57
Charles R. Lawrence III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with Unconscious
Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317 (1987).
58
Reva B. Siegel, “The Rule of Love”: Wife Beating as Prerogative and Privacy, 105 YALE L.J.
2117 (1996).
59
Siegel, Why Equal Protection No Longer Protects, supra note 4.
60
See, e.g., Siegel, Equality Divided, supra note 4, at 15–16.
61
See, e.g., id. at 16–17.
62
426 U.S. 229, 253 (1976) (Stevens, J., concurring).
63
430 U.S. 482, 500–01 (1977).
64
429 U.S. 252, 266 (1977).
65
Brief for Petitioner, supra note 12, at 52–53, 56 (first quoting Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 266;
then quoting Castaneda, 430 U.S. at 494). Section II of this brief sets out a prima facie case of
discriminatory purpose under Arlington Heights by first showing “The Racial Disparities” and observing
“[t]he impact of the official action—whether it ‘bears more heavily on one race than another’ . . .—
provides[s] an important starting point.” Id. at 52 (alterations in original) (citing Arlington Heights,
429 U.S. at 266). “Here, the Baldus studies reveal substantial, unadjusted racial disparities: a death-
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But by the end of the 1970s, the Burger Court had begun to restrict the
role of impact evidence in proving discriminatory purpose.66 Feeney was key.
In the 1979 sex discrimination decision Personnel Administrator of
Massachusetts v. Feeney,67 the Burger Court held that discriminatory
purpose can be found only if “the decisionmaker . . . selected or reaffirmed
a particular course of action at least in part ‘because of,’ not merely ‘in spite
of,’ its adverse effects upon an identifiable group.”68 By requiring a specific
intent to harm, Feeney restricted the inferences about purpose that can be
drawn from impact evidence.
In Columbus Board of Education v. Penick, a school desegregation
decision decided just after Feeney, Justice Powell explained that Feeney had
narrowly defined discriminatory purpose in order to limit the power of
judges: “Courts, of course, should confront discrimination wherever it is
found to exist. But they should recognize limitations on judicial action
inherent in our system . . . .”69 Justice Powell urged the Court to adhere to the
Feeney standard. 70 Justice Powell again invoked Feeney to impose exacting
standards for proof of claims of selective prosecution in his 1985 decision
for the Court in Wayte v. United States.71
Like his opinions in Penick and Wayte, Justice Powell’s opinion in
McCleskey discussed policy reasons for restricting proof of discriminatory

sentencing rate nearly eleven times higher in white-victim cases than in black-victim cases.” Id. at 52–
53.
66
See, e.g., Siegel, Equality Divided, supra note 4, at 17–19. For another historical account of the
evolution of discriminatory purpose doctrine in this era, see Ian Haney-López, Intentional Blindness,
87 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1779 (2012).
67
442 U.S. 256 (1979).
68
Id. at 279 (citing United Jewish Orgs. v. Carey, 430 U.S. 144, 179 (1977) (Stewart, J., concurring
in judgment)).
69
443 U.S. 449, 489 (1979) (Powell, J., dissenting).
70
Id. at 510–11 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Justice Byron White appealed to concerns sounding in
separation of powers and federalism as reasons for requiring discriminatory purpose doctrine in Davis.
426 U.S. 229, 248 (1976).
71
470 U.S. 598 (1985). Wayte involved a claim of selective prosecution for evasion of the military
draft. Justice Powell, writing for the majority, emphasized that “[i]n our criminal justice system, the
Government retains ‘broad discretion’ as to whom to prosecute.” Id. at 607. The majority opinion
incorporated into this Fifth Amendment case “ordinary equal protection standards” under the Fourteenth
Amendment, id. at 608, requiring the petitioner to show that the government’s enforcement system “had
a discriminatory effect and that it was motivated by a discriminatory purpose.” Id. at 608–09 (citing
Feeney, 442 U.S. 256; Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 US. 252 (1977); Davis,
426 U.S. 229). Justice Powell rejected the petitioner’s claim by emphasizing that they would not only
have to show that the government’s enforcement policy had a foreseeable adverse effect but that it had a
discriminatory purpose within the meaning of the Feeney standard. See id. at 610 (referencing Feeney’s
definition of discriminatory purpose).
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purpose. In McCleskey, Justice Powell expressed concern about protecting
“discretion . . . essential to the criminal justice process.”72
Because discretion is essential to the criminal justice process, we would demand
exceptionally clear proof before we would infer that the discretion has been
abused . . . . Accordingly, we hold that the Baldus study is clearly insufficient
to support an inference that any of the decisionmakers in McCleskey’s case
acted with discriminatory purpose.73

With this, the Court restricted the inferences about discriminatory
purpose that can be drawn from statistical evidence and separated proof of
discriminatory purpose in death penalty (and possibly other criminal) cases
from proof of discrimination in equal protection-jury cases and Title VII
cases.
III. HOSTILITY TO STATISTICAL PROOF OF DISCRIMINATION AND
REASONING ABOUT RACE IN MCCLESKEY
In restricting the use of statistics to prove discriminatory purpose, the
Court emphasized its concern about protecting the discretion of juries and
prosecutors. In part the Court seemed to suggest that it was acceptable to
protect discretion fundamental to the process in this way because of the
safeguards against race discrimination already built into the system.74 But
long concluding passages of the opinion sounded a very different note,
suggesting that restricting the use of statistics was necessary to protect the
criminal justice system against discrimination claims and to protect federal
courts from entanglement in politically fraught questions. These sections of
the opinion introduce reasons for restricting proof of discriminatory purpose
not tied to protection of prosecutorial discretion, and are considerably more
troubling.
Writing for the Court, Justice Powell recognized that “if we accepted
McCleskey’s claim . . . we could soon be faced with similar claims as to
other types of penalty” and he foresaw claims based on “unexplained
discrepancies that correlate to membership in other minority groups, and
even to gender.”75 The Court understood that statistical challenges would not
72

McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 297 (1987); see also id. at 313.
Id. at 297.
74
Id. at 313 (“Where the discretion that is fundamental to our criminal process is involved, we
decline to assume that what is unexplained is invidious. In light of the safeguards designed to minimize
racial bias in the process, the fundamental value of jury trial in our criminal justice system, and the
benefits that discretion provides to criminal defendants, we hold that the Baldus study does not
demonstrate a constitutionally significant risk of racial bias affecting the Georgia capital sentencing
process.”).
75
Id. at 315–17.
73
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be cabined to death, or to race, because there were many unexplained
disparities in the American criminal justice system that raise inferences of
bias. To prevent these claims from ever materializing (“there is no limiting
principle to the type of challenge brought by McCleskey”), the McCleskey
majority announced a constitutional principle of indeterminate normative
significance and practical scope: “The Constitution does not require that a
State eliminate any demonstrable disparity that correlates with a potentially
irrelevant factor in order to operate a criminal justice system that includes
capital punishment.”76
Justice William Brennan famously termed this concern “a fear of too
much justice.”77 But what kind of fear is that? On what normative ground
does the majority base this constitutional principle limiting equal protection
claims? What exactly is the majority saying in concluding the McCleskey
opinion as it does?
In voicing skepticism about statistical disparities, the Court was no
longer discussing prosecutorial discretion but seemed instead to be engaging
in contemporary debates about discrimination. At the time of McCleskey,
conservatives in the Reagan administration and Meese Justice Department
objected that the law was too quick to draw inferences that discrimination
explained statistical disparities. They criticized statistical proof of
discrimination in disparate treatment—pattern-and-practice cases, disparate
impact, and affirmative action cases of the day—EEOC v. Sears, Roebuck &
Co.;78 Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio;79 and City of Richmond v. J.A.
Croson Co.80 to name a few. For example, in 1986, as Chair of the EEOC,
Clarence Thomas famously attacked the EEOC’s pattern-and-practice case
of sex discrimination against Sears because the case was based purely on
statistics.81
76

Id. at 318–19.
Id. at 339 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
78
839 F.2d 302, 310 (7th Cir. 1988) (rejecting a pattern-and-practice challenge to Sears’ hiring and
promotion practices of female employees where “[v]irtually all the proof offered by the EEOC . . . [was]
statistical in nature, or related to the statistical evidence” (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks
omitted) (quoting EEOC v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 628 F. Supp. 1264, 1285 (N.D. Ill. 1986))).
79
490 U.S. 642, 650 (1989) (reversing a finding of prima facie disparate impact where “the Court of
Appeals relied solely on respondents’ statistics showing a high percentage of nonwhite workers in the
cannery jobs and a low percentage of such workers in the noncannery positions”).
80
488 U.S. 469, 499 (1989) (striking down Richmond’s remedial plan requiring that prime
contractors subcontract with a set percentage of minority business enterprises partially because it might
“give local governments license to create a patchwork of racial preferences based on statistical
generalizations about any particular field of endeavor”).
81
See Tamar Lewin, Statistics Have Become Suspect in Sex Discrimination Cases, N.Y. TIMES (Feb.
9, 1986), http://www.nytimes.com/1986/02/09/weekinreview/statistics-have-become-suspect-in-sexdiscrimination-cases.html [https://perma.cc/J96P-7LS9]. Lewin writes:
77
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Conservatives who criticized statistical measures as a means of drawing
inferences about discrimination often expressed the belief that social
stratification was better explained by legitimate rather than illegitimate
factors.82 Even when statisticians carefully controlled for variables (David
Baldus examined “230 variables that could have explained the disparities on
nonracial grounds”83), critics were not satisfied. They believed statistical
disparities were more likely caused by legitimate factors such as group
differences in taste and talent than by illegitimate factors such as race
discrimination, and for this reason believed that basing antidiscrimination
liability on statistical evidence amounted to social engineering, an
illegitimate government interference with naturally occurring inequalities
among groups. An attack on disparate impact published by Reagan’s Office
of Legal Policy the same year as McCleskey reasoned that disparate impact
standards would alter “naturally occurring statistical disparities between
groups that are [otherwise] inevitable in a heterogeneous society such as the
United States” and, by doing so, lead to “the permanent institutionalization
of race- and gender-conscious affirmative action.”84 A 1986 Harvard Law
Review article by then-Commissioner on the United States Commission on
Civil Rights Morris Abram similarly argued:
Because groups—black, white, Hispanic, male, and female—do not necessarily
have the same distribution of, among other characteristics, skills, interest,
motivation, and age, a fair shake system may not produce proportional
representation across occupations and professions, and certainly not at any

The E.E.O.C.’s charges were based entirely on statistical evidence that women were not hired or
promoted into commission sales jobs as frequently as men. The commission did not present any
witnesses to testify that they personally had been discriminated against. Although the use of
statistics to show discrimination is standard in large class actions - usually supplemented by
testimony from individuals - the approach is viewed with disfavor by the Reagan Administration.
Indeed, Clarence Thomas, the head of the commission, has said he does not believe in statistical
cases.
And while the commission’s lawyers stayed with the Sears case even after their boss disavowed it,
civil rights advocates do not expect any more such suits during the Reagan years. “This
Administration rejects the well-established practice of using statistics to prove discrimination,” said
Isabelle Katz Pinzler, director of the American Civil Liberties Union’s Women’s Rights Project.
“They want the only cases to be ones where there is a smoking gun, where someone said, ‘I won’t
promote you because you’re a woman or a black.’ Since the days are long past when such cases
existed, this approach is effectively a way of repealing the equal employment laws.”
Id.
82
See, e.g., HERITAGE FOUND., Ending Discrimination in Civil Rights, in A MANDATE FOR
LEADERSHIP REPORT: AGENDA ’83, at 206, 208 (Richard N. Holwill ed., 1983) (criticizing the continued
use of the “effects test” and calling for a new evidentiary standard in which “an uneven result is not
necessarily an inequitable result”).
83
McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 287 (1987).
84
OFFICE OF LEGAL POLICY, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, REDEFINING DISCRIMINATION: “DISPARATE
IMPACT” AND THE INSTITUTIONALIZATION OF AFFIRMATIVE ACTION, at i (1987).
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given time. This uneven distribution, however, is not necessarily the result of
discrimination.85

(As I have elsewhere pointed out, this belief in racial group difference might
not be especially surprising were it not espoused by advocates of
“colorblindness.”86)
The attack on statistical proof of discrimination was not just New Right
music in the air. Conservative critics imported these concerns about group
differences into the argument over the use of statistics in proving
discrimination in the criminal justice setting. An amicus brief by the
Washington Legal Foundation attacked McCleskey’s arguments as calling
for “racial proportionality” in the administration of criminal justice.87
“Acceptance of petitioner’s argument would open the door to Title VII-style
‘disparate impact’ challenges to criminal sentences of all kinds.”88 “No
workable system of criminal justice could accommodate the demands for
race- and class-based parity in sentencing advanced by petitioner. Nor does
the Constitution require a regime of ‘statistical justice’ which would subject
the validity of every criminal sentence to the vagaries and manipulations of
fluctuating demographic data.”89 It is “the considered judgment of our law
that seemingly ‘disproportionate’ outcomes in terms of race or other
characteristics are generally explainable by a host of legitimate factors other
than actionable discrimination . . . .”90
These objections to statistical evidence of discrimination appear in
McCleskey itself, in the passages of the opinion which worried that
acceptance of McCleskey’s claim would invite constitutional challenges to
all manner of criminal penalties based on “statistical disparities” and
“unexplained discrepancies” relating to different demographic grounds, not
only as to defendants, but as to all participants in the criminal justice
system.91

85
Morris B. Abram, Affirmative Action: Fair Shakers and Social Engineers, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1312,
1315 (1986).
86
Reva B. Siegel, The Racial Rhetorics of Colorblind Constitutionalism: The Case of Hopwood v.
Texas, in RACE AND REPRESENTATION: AFFIRMATIVE ACTION 29, 58–61 (Robert Post & Michael Rogin
eds., 1998).
87
Brief Amicus Curiae of the Washington Legal Foundation and the Allied Educational Foundation
in Support of Respondent at 13–14, McCleskey, 481 U.S. 279 (No. 84-6811) (“Petitioner’s theory holds
that any deviation from statistically-based norms of racially proportional outcomes in a capital sentencing
system would ‘require the invalidation of that system as a whole.’”).
88
Id. at 16.
89
Id. at 17.
90
Id. at 11.
91
McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 314–19 (1987).
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It was to limit such claims that the opinion closed by restricting the
inferences of bias that could be drawn from statistical discrepancies in a
capital case: “The Constitution does not require that a State eliminate any
demonstrable disparity that correlates with a potentially irrelevant factor in
order to operate a criminal justice system that includes capital punishment.”92
Justice Powell offered no justification for this “fear of too much justice”93
claim other than to quote a fragment of Gregg v. Georgia94 for the newly
constructed principle that “the Constitution does not ‘plac[e] totally
unrealistic conditions on its use.’”95
But to what kind of realism is the Court appealing? What is the
empirical or normative basis of this constitutional principle limiting
statistical evidence of discrimination? In its closing, cryptic appeal to
realism, the Court may have intimated doubt that racial discrimination
accounted for disparities in the commission of crimes and adverted instead
to explanations tied to racial group differences favored by conservatives.96
92

Id. at 319.
Id. at 339 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
94
428 U.S. 153 (1976).
95
McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 319 (alteration in original) (quoting Gregg, 428 U.S. at 199 n.50). Gregg
invoked realism in rejecting a claim under Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972), that “opportunities
for discretionary action” in Georgia’s capital punishment scheme violated the Eighth Amendment. See
Gregg, 428 U.S. at 199. In Gregg, the Court explained that: “[t]he petitioner’s argument is nothing more
than a veiled contention that Furman indirectly outlawed capital punishment by placing totally unrealistic
conditions on its use.” Id. at 199 n.50. Thus, Gregg offers no general principle of the kind Justice Powell
seems to impute to it.
96
A belief that social stratification is more often explained by group differences rather than by
discrimination fueled conservative critique of antidiscrimination law. See supra notes 82–85 and
accompanying text. This is the tacit argument of the Washington Legal Foundation brief discussed supra
notes 87–90 and accompanying text. Justice Powell seemed to have these considerations in mind. While
working on early drafts of his opinion, Justice Powell sent one of his law clerks to gather Federal Bureau
of Investigation (FBI) statistics showing that most murders were committed by black people against black
victims. In a November 8, 1986 memo to the clerk, Justice Powell wrote:
If and when you have an hour or two, take a look at the FBI’s report on “Crime in the United States”
to see whether any of the statistical studies or charts may be of interest. Studies we initiated when
I was on the Crime Commission indicated that most murders—at least percentage wise and I think
also in absolute terms—were committed by blacks on blacks. Also, in general, most of the crimes
committed by blacks were on black victims. The FBI study should also show the percentage of
major crimes committed by blacks in comparison with the number of such crimes committed by
whites, and with respect to both races in comparison with the state or metropolitan area population
figures.
Memorandum from Lewis F. Powell, Jr., Assoc. Justice, Supreme Court of the U.S., to Leslie 2–3 (Nov.
8, 1986) (located in Justice Powell’s McCleskey v. Kemp Case File on file with Washington & Lee
University
School
of
Law
Library
at
133–35),
https://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1168&
context=casefiles [https://perma.cc/CJ2D-JHD9]. The requested copies of the FBI reports can also be
found in Justice Powell’s files, with the relevant sentences underlined. See, e.g., FED. BUREAU OF
INVESTIGATION, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS: CRIME IN THE UNITED STATES (July
27, 1986) (located in Justice Powell’s McCleskey v. Kemp Case File on file with Washington & Lee
93
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The Court’s appeal to realism surely warned of political limits on judges’
capacity to intervene in the criminal law. (McCleskey’s closing citation to
Gregg adverted to the Court’s failed effort to impose constitutional
limitations on the death penalty.97)
Justice Powell concluded the McCleskey opinion by insisting that the
racial stratification of the criminal justice system, like the racial segregation
of the public schools, was a political and not a legal question, best handled
by legislatures and not by courts. The reasons he offered for discounting
inferences about discrimination that could be drawn from statistical evidence
in this passage of the opinion did not concern prosecutorial discretion but
instead concerned “the moral values of the people.”98 Echoing Justice Byron
White in Washington v. Davis,99 and his own opinion in Penick,100 Justice
Powell asserted:
McCleskey’s arguments are best presented to the legislative bodies. It is not the
responsibility—or indeed even the right—of this Court to determine the
appropriate punishment for particular crimes. It is the legislatures, the elected
representatives of the people, that are “constituted to respond to the will and
consequently the moral values of the people.” Legislatures also are better
qualified to weigh and “evaluate the results of statistical studies in terms of their
own local conditions and with a flexibility of approach that is not available to
the courts.”101

At a time when the political branches were engaged in a “War on
Crime,”102 incarceration rates were skyrocketing,103 and racial discrepancies
University
School
of
Law
Library
at
211–12),
https://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?
article=1168&context=casefiles [https://perma.cc/CJ2D-JHD9].
97
See supra note 95 and accompanying text.
98
McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 319 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Furman v. Georgia,
408 U.S. 238, 383 (1972) (Burger, C.J., dissenting)).
99
426 U.S. 229, 248 (1976).
100
443 U.S. 449, 489 (1979) (Powell, J., dissenting).
101
McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 319 (first quoting Furman, 408 U.S. at 383 (Burger, C.J., dissenting);
then quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 US. 153, 186 (1976)); see Siegel, Equality Divided, supra note 4, at
20–23 (discussing how the Burger Court developed discriminatory purpose doctrine as a doctrine of
judicial deference to political ordering); id. at 23 (“In the 1970s, conservatives who sought to limit the
role of federal courts in enforcing the Equal Protection Clause advocated deference to representative
government, urging that plaintiffs redirect their [race discrimination] claims to the legislative arena.”)
102
See, e.g., ELIZABETH HINTON, FROM THE WAR ON POVERTY TO THE WAR ON CRIME: THE
MAKING OF MASS INCARCERATION IN AMERICA 308–09 (2016) (discussing how “the Reagan
administration built upon the strategies its predecessors pursued for the War on Crime, including the
militarization of local police forces, the criminalization of social programs, and mass incarceration”).
103
The McCleskey decision occurred at a time of unprecedented growth for the American criminal
justice system. During the mid-1980s, “over 90% of all the states in the United States were at the high
point of the century for rates of imprisonment,” Franklin E. Zimring, The Scale of Imprisonment in the
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in incarceration rates were in the headlines,104 the Court rejected
McCleskey’s claim on the grounds that it was better suited for political than
legal resolution. The Court identified problems with relying on statistics to
prove discriminatory purpose in the criminal justice system—while saying
nothing about the costs to the constitutional order of excluding evidence of
this kind.
*

*

*

For decades political liberals have criticized Washington v. Davis and
complained that the Supreme Court required equal protection complainants
to prove discriminatory purpose. But having required proof of purpose,
perhaps as remarkable are the obstacles to proof of purpose that the Court
has imposed.
No plaintiff can meet Feeney’s evidentiary burden when courts have
chosen to apply it.105 And as numerous commentators have observed,
United States: Twentieth Century Patterns and Twenty-First Century Prospects, 100 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 1225, 1232 (2010), and over the course of the decade “the incarcerated population more
than doubled in size across all three levels [federal, state, and jail],” NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, THE
GROWTH OF INCARCERATION IN THE UNITED STATES: EXPLORING CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES 39
(Jeremy Travis et al. eds., 2014). This growth was particularly pronounced when viewed in comparative
international perspective. See JESSICA JACOBSON ET AL., PRISON: EVIDENCE OF ITS USE AND OVER-USE
FROM AROUND THE WORLD 4 (2017) (demonstrating the marked increase in the U.S. prison population
compared to ten other nations).
As McCleskey made its way to the Supreme Court, America’s booming prison population was a focus
of national attention. See, e.g., Arthur S. Brisbane, Crime and Punishment: The Push for Prisons, WASH.
POST, Mar. 3, 1985, at A01, A14 (describing the “unmanageable horde” of inmates as the national “prison
population soared”); Editorial, The Prison Population, WASH. POST, Aug. 17, 1985, at A18 (noting that
America’s prisons had a “population explosion in the last dozen years”); Saundra Saperstein, District Not
Alone in Prison Crisis: 35 States Under Court Orders to End Inmate Overcrowding, WASH. POST, July
20, 1986, at A1 (observing that “the number of inmates in the nation is at an all-time high— more than . . .
double the figure a decade before”).
104
In the years before McCleskey, commentators highlighted the severe racial disparities apparent in
the growing numbers of the incarcerated. See, e.g., Black Men More Likely to Serve Time in Prison, N.Y.
TIMES: AROUND THE NATION, July 29, 1985 (highlighting that “[b]lack men are six times more likely
than white men to serve in a state prison,” according to a Justice Department report); Bob Keeler, Study:
Prison Population to Grow, NEWSDAY, Aug. 27, 1985, at 17 (discussing the overrepresentation of
minorities in New York prisons and sentencing laws that are “particularly harsh on minorities”);
Courtland Milloy, A Black Criminal Profile, WASH. POST, July 22, 1986, at B3 (discussing prison reform
and how “the factor of race must be dealt with head-on . . . [because] blacks in America, while only oneeighth of the population, are convicted of half of all rapes, robberies, and murders”); Wendell Rawls, Jr.,
Crises and Cutbacks Stir Fresh Concerns on Nation’s Prisons, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 5, 1982 (highlighting
that in addition to higher imprisonment rates, black individuals face “harsher sentences than others who
have committed similar crimes”).
105
See Haney-López, supra note 66, at 1783 (“Theoretically, the existence of an illicit purpose is the
touchstone of the doctrine. In practice, however, the requirement that malice be proved is so exacting
that, since this test was announced in 1979 [in Feeney], it has never been met—not even once.”); Siegel,
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language in the McCleskey opinion offers another powerful obstacle to
discriminatory purpose claims—allowing, if not encouraging, judges to
refuse inferences of discriminatory purpose from statistical disparities,
unless litigants are creative in coupling statistical and nonstatistical evidence
as the plaintiffs were in Floyd v. City of New York,106 New York’s stop-andfrisk case. At the time of McCleskey, Randy Kennedy107 and Skip Gates108
described the limits on statistical proof of purpose that the decision helped
to consolidate and enforce. Decades later, Aziz Huq,109 Michael Selmi,110 and
David Sklansky among others111 report much the same story.
With racism, and interest in discriminatory purpose doctrine
resurgent,112 there is good reason to examine the constraints on proof of
Why Equal Protection No Longer Protects, supra note 4, at 1139–41 (illustrating how “courts now use
Feeney’s definition of discriminatory purpose to justify a decision to uphold facially neutral state action
that has a disparate impact on protected classes”).
106
959 F. Supp. 2d 540 (S.D.N.Y. 2013). In addition to statistical evidence, the plaintiffs submitted
evidence that the highest-ranking New York Police Department (NYPD) officer identified “young black
and Hispanic youths [aged] 14 to 20” as the targeted population for stop and frisk. Id. at 603.
107
Randall L. Kennedy, McCleskey v. Kemp: Race, Capital Punishment, and the Supreme Court,
101 HARV. L. REV. 1388, 1420–21 (1988) (concluding that “it is unlikely that the doctrine of purposeful
discrimination will ever facilitate judicial intervention against the sort of conduct delineated by the Baldus
study”).
108
Henry Louis Gates, Statistical Stigmata, 11 CARDOZO L. REV. 1275, 1282 (1990) (writing that
McCleskey makes it “doubtful whether statistical evidence—no matter how strong—can ever consitute
[sic] clear and compelling evidence of purposeful discrimination”).
109
Aziz Z. Huq, The Consequences of Disparate Policing: Evaluating Stop and Frisk as a Modality
of Urban Policing, 101 MINN. L. REV. 2397, 2453–55 (2017) (stating that “McCleskey established a nearinsurmountable barrier” to proving an equal protection violation through statistics of disparate impact and
“[a]bsent the miraculous happenstance of testimonial or documentary evidence of bias—a stroke of luck
that befell plaintiffs in the challenge to New York’s SQF policy [Floyd]— McCleskey means that the
courthouse door is effectively shut to discriminatory-purpose challenges in the criminal justice context”).
110
Selmi, supra note 8, at 213 n.74, 215 (describing McCleskey as the “the most vivid illustration”
of a hostility to statistical evidence that renders “further progress challenging statistical disparities through
litigation . . . unlikely”).
111
See, e.g., Sharad Goel, Maya Perelman, Ravi Shroff & David Alan Sklansky, Combatting Police
Discrimination in the Age of Big Data, 20 NEW CRIM. L. REV. 181, 200, 202 (2016) (“With few
exceptions, lower court decisions addressing statistical proof of police discrimination echo McCleskey’s
reluctance to use statistical evidence to infer discriminatory intent. . . . The bottom line is that unless
officers admit to racial animus, or perhaps if the disparate impact is as striking as in Yick Wo, an equal
protection challenge is likely to fail for lack of proof that the police in this particular case or set of cases
acted with discriminatory purpose.”); see also John M. Powers, State v. Robinson and the Racial Justice
Act: Statistical Evidence of Racial Discrimination in Capital Proceedings, 29 HARV. J. RACIAL & ETHNIC
JUST. 117, 128 (2013) (“[McCleskey] eliminated the possibility that defendants could make a cognizable
claim under either the Eighth or Fourteenth Amendments based on statistical evidence of racial
discrimination in charging or sentencing decisions. McCleskey’s burden of proof . . . is generally
acknowledged to be impossible to meet.”).
112
See supra note 7 and accompanying text; Bagenstos, supra note 8 (manuscript at 9) (“Indeed, at
a moment in history when overt racism—seen in the reaction among some to the election of a black
president, and in a significant part of the movement that elected Donald Trump—once again seems a
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purpose that the Rehnquist Court incorporated into equal protection law as
courts were ending the Second Reconstruction. It may be that these
constraints on the kinds of evidence that judges may consider in evaluating
claims of discriminatory purpose are due for reconsideration.
Although Justice Powell did not write McCleskey in such a way as to
clarify the conditions warranting restrictions on the use of statistical
evidence, judges can read McCleskey with attention to these questions. For
instance, some courts have implied that they might consider statistical
studies that are coupled with circumstantial evidence113 or that focus on the
specific prosecutorial officer or entity at issue.114 In cases not involving the
death penalty or prosecutorial discretion, courts consider statistical evidence
of discriminatory policing without pausing to distinguish McCleskey.115
major factor in our public life, the suggestion that implicit bias is the central problem may be particularly
misleading.”).
113
In his opinion, Justice Powell emphasized that McCleskey “relie[d] solely on the Baldus study.”
McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 293 (1987) (emphasis added). And in the early stages of drafting the
opinion, Justice Powell also wrote in his notes that “Criminal cases should not be decided on basis of
statistics alone.” Note of Lewis F. Powell, Jr., Assoc. Justice, Supreme Court of the U.S. 4 (Oct. 1986)
(located in Justice Powell’s McCleskey v. Kemp Case File on file with Washington & Lee University
School
of
Law
Library
at
103–07),
https://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1168&context=casefiles
[https://perma.cc/95EF-CNQZ].
Perhaps noting this language, some courts have suggested a willingness to consider statistical
evidence of discriminatory purpose as long as it is coupled with circumstantial evidence. See, e.g., Chavez
v. Illinois State Police, 251 F.3d 612, 648 (7th Cir. 2001) (“In this context, statistics may not be the sole
proof of a constitutional violation and neither Chavez nor Lee have presented sufficient non-statistical
evidence to demonstrate discriminatory intent.” (emphasis added)). In addition, some courts have rejected
particular statistics offered by litigants but signaled that they might be willing to consider more persuasive
or well-constructed statistical analyses. See, e.g., United States v. Laneham, No. CV-16-2930 JB,
2017 WL 4857437, at *27 (D.N.M. Oct. 25, 2017); United States v. Johnson, 122 F. Supp. 3d 272, 360
(M.D.N.C. 2015).
114
Whereas the Baldus study in McCleskey applied to death sentences across the state of Georgia,
some courts have expressed a willingness to consider more targeted statistics that apply to the specific
prosecutorial officer or entity at issue in the case—such as a county prosecutor’s office, individual
prosecutor, or police officer. See, e.g., Belmontes v. Brown, 414 F.3d 1094, 1127 (9th Cir. 2005) (“Unlike
McCleskey, . . . Belmontes offered statistics that provided information limited to the charging
entity . . . .”); Jefferson v. Terry, 490 F. Supp. 2d 1261, 1340 (N.D. Ga. 2007) (“[U]nlike in McCleskey,
Petitioner presents evidence pertaining to the specific decision maker in his case.”); Commonwealth v.
Lora, No. 20020413, 2003 WL 22350945, at *13 (Mass. Super. Ct. Sept. 12, 2003) (“[C]ourts are more
apt to accept statistics as evidence of invidious discrimination when . . . the sample focuses on decisions
made by individuals rather than . . . by departments or branches . . . .”). But in two of those cases, the
court still found that there was no equal protection violation because the prosecutor could offer a raceneutral, legitimate motive. See Belmontes, 414 F.3d at 1128–29; Jefferson, 490 F. Supp. 2d at 1341.
115
See, e.g., Mehta v. Village of Bolingbrook, 196 F. Supp. 3d 855, 864 (N.D. Ill. 2016) (“A jury
could conclude, based on these statistics, that Bolingbrook police conduct their law enforcement duties
differently when confronted with members of racial, ethnic, and religious minorities.”); Smith v. City of
Chicago, 143 F. Supp. 3d 741, 754–56 (N.D. Ill. 2015) (referring to a series of statistics and noting that
“[p]laintiffs have more than adequately alleged a plausible equal protection claim in relation to the
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The use of statistics in these cases present openings for change. Judges
may not be moved by the same considerations that seemed to guide the
McCleskey Court, especially when judges can see the effects of decades of
judicial abdication. Still, the spirit of McCleskey continues to guide many
judges.
CONCLUSION: SECURING EQUAL TREATMENT, WITH OR WITHOUT COURTS
I am a student of Owen Fiss’s. I do not give up on courts.116 But I am a
student of Owen Fiss’s who graduated in the era of Bowers v. Hardwick117
and McCleskey. McCleskey was decided by a Court openly skeptical about
its role in enforcing equality rights—a Court of the kind the nation has long
faced and in all likelihood will face in the near term. For this reason, as well
as many others, advocates interested in securing enforcement of the
Constitution’s equality guarantees in the criminal justice system cannot rely
on courts alone. We need pluricentric—rather than juricentric—modes of
enforcing the Constitution.118
Empirical social science can illuminate bias in the criminal justice
system. But given an unwilling—or even reticent—judiciary, it may not
make best sense to imagine judges as the primary agents for implementing
the insights of critical social science, as, for example, much writing on

purportedly unconstitutional stop and frisk policy”); Floyd v. City of New York, 959 F. Supp. 2d 540,
562 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (“Both statistical and anecdotal evidence showed that minorities are indeed treated
differently than whites.”).
116
See, e.g., Reva B. Siegel, Community in Conflict: Same-Sex Marriage and Backlash, 64 UCLA
L. REV. 1728 (2017) (describing how courts can engender new understandings of equality rights even
under conditions of backlash).
117
478 U.S. 186 (1986).
118
Cf. Robert C. Post & Reva B. Siegel, Legislative Constitutionalism and Section Five Power:
Policentric Interpretation of the Family and Medical Leave Act, 112 YALE L.J. 1943, 1947, 2026–32
(2003) (observing that the Constitution has “multiple interpreters, both political and legal” and discussing
the distinctive goods that courts and representative government each contribute to enforcing the
Constitution).
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implicit bias has.119 Indeed, the best understanding of the social science may
counsel putting it into practice outside courtroom settings.120
For these and other reasons, scholars have channeled implicit bias
interventions directly into the criminal justice system, where the research can
help decisionmakers on the street and on the bench become aware of the
unconscious biases they may have.121 Actors in representative branches of
119
Numerous scholars, led by Linda Krieger, have drawn on social science evidence of implicit bias
to propose new liability standards for federal employment discrimination law. See, e.g., Linda Hamilton
Krieger, The Content of Our Categories: A Cognitive Bias Approach to Discrimination and Equal
Employment Opportunity, 47 STAN L. REV. 1161, 1211 (1995) (“The assumptions underlying Title VII’s
disparate treatment theory have been so substantially undermined by social cognition theory that they can
no longer be considered valid.”). It appears that in twenty years two Title VII cases have endorsed the
notion of implicit bias. See Thomas v. Eastman Kodak Co., 183 F.3d 38, 42 (1st Cir. 1999); Kimble v.
Wisconsin Dep’t of Workforce Dev., 690 F. Supp. 2d 765, 775–76 (E.D. Wis. 2010). Kimble has not been
followed since it was decided in 2010.
For examples of commentators applying implicit bias work in the constitutional context, see Ivan E.
Bodensteiner, The Implications of Psychological Research Related to Unconscious Discrimination and
Implicit Bias in Proving Intentional Discrimination, 73 MO. L. REV. 83, 127 (2008) (calling for
modifications to burdens of proof) and Reshma M. Saujani, “The Implicit Association Test”: A Measure
of Unconscious Racism in Legislative Decision-Making, 8 MICH. J. RACE & L. 395, 422 (2003)
(“Plaintiffs should be able to use the Implicit Association Test as circumstantial evidence within the
Arlington Heights factors to demonstrate that the challenged practice was not constitutionally justified
and relief is warranted because of unconscious prejudice on the part of the decision-maker.”), and
compare Eva Paterson et al., The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection in the 21st Century: Building upon
Charles Lawrence’s Vision to Mount a Contemporary Challenge to the Intent Doctrine, 40 CONN. L.
REV. 1175, 1191 (2008) (“While the ultimate goal of dismantling the Intent Doctrine may, at present,
appear somewhat remote, legal scholars and practitioners have made significant headway in recent years
towards chipping away at its foundations. In several areas of law, litigators have begun marshalling social
science evidence around implicit and institutional bias and using this evidence to help prove instances of
discrimination.”).
120
See Jerry Kang, The Missing Quadrants of Antidiscrimination: Going Beyond the “Prejudice
Polygraph”, 68 J. SOC. ISSUES 314 (2012). Jerry Kang urges use of implicit bias research, not only to
prove discrimination but to stimulate self-awareness among a range of decisionmakers with authority and
influence. Id. at 315.
121
For example, social psychologist Lorie Fridell has become a leader in addressing biased policing.
She conducts trainings at law enforcement agencies across the country, aiming to use the science of bias
to educate officers about the effects of unconscious bias and to teach them about managing and reducing
their biases. See Lorie Fridell, This Is Not Your Grandparents’ Prejudice: The Implications of the Modern
Science of Bias for Police Training, TRANSLATIONAL CRIMINOLOGY, Fall 2013, at 10, 11 (2013).
Professor Phillip Atiba Goff, an expert in contemporary forms of racial bias and discrimination, also
conducts interventions involving implicit bias training in police departments across the nation. Megan
Harris, Meet the Man Helping Pittsburgh Police Confront Their Racial Biases, PITTSBURGH NPR (Sept.
21,
2017),
http://wesa.fm/post/meet-man-helping-pittsburgh-police-confront-their-racial-biases
[https://perma.cc/94RT-KAJC]. In addition, in a study that received widespread attention, neuroscience
and psychology professor Josh Correll developed a simulator to study and explore the impacts of police
officers’ implicit biases in decisions to shoot. See Tom James, Can Cops Unlearn Their Unconscious
Biases?, ATLANTIC (Dec. 23, 2017), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2017/12/implicit-biastraining-salt-lake/548996 [https://perma.cc/A9AF-9YJP]. The Justice Collaboratory at Yale Law School
combines procedural justice and implicit bias training for police officers. See, e.g., Megan Quattlebaum,
Presentation to the Connecticut Police Training Task Force, CONN. GEN. ASSEMBLY (Dec. 9, 2016),
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government can require law enforcement personnel to participate in
debiasing trainings, just as legislators may require themselves to take
account of the racial impact of their decisions122—even if judges never
interpret the Constitution to require it.
None of these interventions takes the place of a state or federal judge
constraining discriminatory excesses in the criminal justice system. But each
intervention illustrates biases that exist in the criminal justice system, and
demonstrates social-scientific tools available to identify and begin to address
them. These interventions can make a crucial difference in their own right.
And they can establish roles for social-scientific tools in the criminal justice
system so that courts might over time come to see reasons to allow and even
to mandate their use.

https://www.cga.ct.gov/ps/tfs/20161206_Task%20Force%20to%20Study%20the%20Curriculum%20an
d%20Education%20of%20Police%20Officers/20161206/Meeting%201%20Powerpoint.pdf
[https://perma.cc/7RWJ-PQV9]. Interventions to stem implicit bias are also occurring in sectors outside
of policing, including among teachers to combat school-to-prison pipelines and among judges and
attorneys to help debias perceptions and improve interactions. See Implicit Bias Toolbox, AMERICAN BAR
ASSOCIATION, https://www.americanbar.org/groups/litigation/initiatives/task-force-implicitbias/implicit-bias-toolbox.html [https://perma.cc/9QYN-CW7P] (describing a “Toolbox for . . .
exploring implicit bias and approaches to ‘debiasing’” aimed at attorneys and judges); Juvenile Justice
and Education, CENTER FOR POLICING EQUITY, http://policingequity.org/juvenile-justice-education
[https://perma.cc/PKZ5-YS2D] (describing the Center for Policing Equity’s work in developing an
implicit bias training for educators and school resource officers to combat school-to-prison pipelines).
122
See, e.g., U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, THE CIVIL RIGHTS DIVISION’S PATTERN AND PRACTICE POLICE
REFORM WORK: 1994–PRESENT (2017) (describing how the Civil Rights Division’s police reform
agreements with the Baltimore Police Department, Newark Police Department, Ferguson Police
Department, Cleveland Police Department, Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department, New Orleans
Police Department, and East Haven Police Department all require officers to undergo implicit bias
training, as it is “a core feature of the Division’s reform agreements”); Press Release, U.S. Dept. of
Justice, Department of Justice Announces New Department-Wide Implicit Bias Training for Personnel
(June 27, 2016), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/department-justice-announces-new-department-wideimplicit-bias-training-personnel [https://perma.cc/RKP4-FAB3] (announcing that the Department of
Justice made implicit bias training mandatory for its own law enforcement agents and prosecutors); J.
David Goodman & Al Baker, De Blasio Kept Crime Down in First Term. His Next Goal: Nicer Police,
N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 5, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/11/05/nyregion/bill-deblasio-policecrime.html [https://perma.cc/UD4C-J9UZ] (noting New York City Mayor Bill de Blasio’s plan to add
implicit bias training to the NYPD training curriculum); Nicole D. Porter, Racial Impact Statements,
SENTENCING PROJECT (Dec. 1, 2014), https://www.sentencingproject.org/publications/racial-impactstatements [https://perma.cc/NEM6-8LM5] (describing how a few states have begun evaluating the
potential disparities of proposed legislation prior to adoption and implementation by using racial impact
statements).
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